THE DIRECTIVES OF THE RED ARMY

The first directive of the Soviet Supreme Command regarding the Hungarian territories was issued on 29^th. August 1944.96 This directive determined the direction of the further offensive for the Third Ukrainian Front towards Dobrudja and Bulgaria, and at the same time it subordinated the Soviet Danube fleet to this front.

The Second Ukrainian Front was divided into two army groups from the operational point of view by the same directive. The Twenty-seventh and Fifty-third Armies of the left wing and the Sixth Guard Tank army had to continue their offensive westward. The three armies had to get into the district of Pitesti by 7^th  September and then they had to continue the offensive towards the Iron Gate. The task of the right wing: the Seventh Guard-Army, the Fortieth Army and the Armoured Cavalry Group of General Gorshkov had to seize the passes of the East-Carpathian Mountains from the Máramaros Alps to the Ojtozi Defile. They had to reach the Beszterce-Kolozsvár-Nagyenyed-Nagyszeben line and finish the occupation of the Moldavian territories of Roumania by the 7^th  September, then continue the offensive towards Szatmárnémeti, and at the same time help their neighbours on the right, the Fourth Ukrainian Front, to break through the defensive lines of the Northeastern Carpathians.

The second directive of the Soviet Supreme Command was issued one week later, just on the day that the Third Hungarian Army began its offensive for the re-occupation of Southern Transylvania.  The difference between the directives was that the second gave instructions not about the activity of the Second and Third Fronts, but about the activity of the Second and Fourth Ukrainian Fronts.  In other words, the Soviet military leadership already counted on the co-operation of these two fronts in the Transylvanian and Hungarian front lines. The Fourth Ukrainian Front was given the task of breaking through the Northern Carpathians to reach the area of Ungvár-Munkács, then continuing the advance towards Csap-Nyíregyháza and creating a connection between its left wing and the Second Ukrainian Front.

The right wing of the Second Ukrainian Front (Fortieth Army, Seventh Guards Army) had to accelerate its crossing through the Eastern Carpathians.  In order to support the offensive of the right wing, the twenty-seventh Army and the Sixth Guards Tank Army had to deviate from their task given in the previous directive. They had to pass the Southern Carpathians and launch an offensive towards Nagyszeben-Kolozsvár. They had to get to the Szatmárnémeti-Kolozsvár-Déva line by 15^th  September.   Moreover, the Sixth Guards Tank Army also received a separate task: throwing both its corps into combat, it had to seize Meggyes and Gyulafehérvár as an intermediate target of the offensive. The Fifty-third Army also had to turn to the right, and, having passed the Southern Carpathians, making contacts with the above mentioned two armies, it had to get to the line of Lugos, by an offensive towards Petrozsény-Déva. The Forty sixth Army, together with the 75^th Rifle Corps of the Fifty third Army, had to continue the offensive South of the Carpathians, towards Turnu Severin.  As a more distant task, the whole Front had to reach the Nyíregyháza-Szeged line.

The armoured cavalry group of General Gorshkov was cut in two by this directive but it did not cease to exist as an organisation group at the army level. The 23^rd Armoured Corps had to step out of the front line (the Ojtozi defile) and, outflanking the Carpathian Mountains from the South, it had to regroup in the region of Brassó and launch an offensive from there in the direction of Csíkszereda.  As Csíkszereda was also the operational target originally assigned for this group, and the other corps of the Gorshkov Group, the 5^th Guards Cavalry Corps, had to strike from the passes lying on the Eastern edges of Székelyföld, the two corps had to meet at Csíkszereda.  By this manoeuvre the Soviet military leadership wanted to surround the German-Hungarian troops fighting in the southern region of the Székelyföld. The right wing of the Second Ukrainian Front had to make contact with the Fourth Ukrainian Front, which was to arrive from the Northeast, in the Nyírség (the north-eastern corner of the Great Hungarian Plain).  This was the tactical conception of the Soviet Supreme Command for surrounding the Eighth German Army, and the First and Second Hungarian Armies.

The Sixth Guards Tank Army and the Twenty seventh and Fifty third Armies did not wait for the 5^th September Directive of the Supreme Command. They had already crossed the passes of the Southern Carpathians which were in Roumanian hands in accordance with the preliminary instructions of Marshal Malinovski, the Commander of the Second Ukrainian Front and, because of the development of the operational situation, in the course of pursuing the retreating remnants of the German troops. The reconnaissance planes of the Fourth German Air Fleet already reported the appearance of the Soviet columns in the Tömösi-Defile, leading towards Brassó, and in the Vöröstorony-Defile, leading towards Nagyszeben. The 23^rd Armoured Corps of the Red Army also began the execution of its manoeuvre on 4^th September, before the issuing of the directive of the Soviet Supreme Command under the orders of Marshal Malinovski.